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Abstract 
This focus is on conflicts in which the British South African Company (BSAC) had a 
direct hand, and in which British forces were victorious. Three specific conflicts will 
be highlighted: the First Matabele War (1893–1894), the First Chimurenga (1896–
1897), and the Second Anglo Boer War/South African War (1899–1902). It is argued 
that the Cape Dutch Reformed Church’s (DRC) missionary enterprise directly and 
indirectly benefited from these wars. The personal letters and other writings of A. A. 
Louw, pioneer DRC missionary to Mashonaland, reveal a relatively good relationship 
with Cecil John Rhodes and the BSAC. The weakening of powerful local polities 
through the colonial suppression of African uprisings might have helped mission 
stations such as the DRC’s Morgenstêr to attain surrogate status as centres of power in 
the affected areas. After the South African War, a number of Boer prisoners of war 
were recruited for the DRC missionary campaigns, including Mashonaland. A 
contextualising feature to this narrative of Afrikaner mission in British Colonial 
Africa is the fact that two of the foremost recruiting agents were direct family 
members of A. A. Louw. 
 
Keywords: Afrikaners; British Empire; Dutch Reformed Church (DRC); Mashonaland; 
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Introduction 
There are two background questions that resulted in the writing of this article: 1) What were 
the historical connections between war and mission? 2) How did British Imperialism 
influence the missionary enterprise of the Afrikaans Dutch Reformed Church? I proceed from 
the counterintuitive thesis that British imperial wars in southern Africa had somehow 
strengthened the Dutch Reformed Church (hereafter DRC) mission enterprise; in other words 
that these acted as a series of turning points in the trajectory of the DRC. This is 
counterintuitive because wars have usually been extremely disruptive of missionary activities 
worldwide. One example is the absolutely devastating effect WWI had on German missions 
in Africa and elsewhere.1  
 
This leads to the further question: Why posit a thesis that seems contradictable, because of its 
apparent implausibility? The basic answer to that concerns the well-documented case of the 
growth experienced by the DRC mission in the aftermath of the South African War. Despite 
the wide-scale destruction, loss of life and limb, disrupted social systems, spiritual angst and 
more resulting from this three-year conflict, the aftermath was characterised by a period of 
significant growth in the missionary enterprise of the DRC, on which I shall elaborate below. 
What makes this particularly interesting is the fact that the white Afrikaner population group, 
with whom the DRC particularly associated, was the group that actually lost in the 
abovementioned war. This is the case if one accepts the standard narrative that the vast 
majority of Afrikaners—irrespective of where they actually lived in southern Africa—were 
sympathetic to the cause of the Boer republics. Given this somewhat ironic reversal of 
fortunes experienced through the DRC mission, I thought it might be useful to also consider 
other British colonial conflicts during the late nineteenth century that could have influenced 
DRC mission activities. I focus on the so-called First Matabele2 War (1893–4) and the 
Mashonaland uprisings of 1896. These conflicts occurred in relative close proximity to the 
recently germanised mission of the DRC in the area. In fact, some local Shona rebellions had 
already occurred in the early 1890s after the imposition of colonial authority, and I shall refer 
to a specific conflict in 1892 that involved the DRC mission directly. 
 
                                               
1  See, for example, J. T. Barton, “The Effect of the War on Protestant Missions,” The Harvard Theological Review, 12 
no. 1 (1919): 1–35. 
2     The term Matabele is a colonial era corruption of the word Ndebele. Due to the fact that Matabele is uniformly used in 
the sources referred to in this article, I have maintained its usage throughout to avoid confusing the uninformed reader 
with more than one word in reference to the same group of people.     
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All of these conflicts and associated trauma influenced the mission’s work, but how exactly? 
Is it possible that these conflicts helped to create a strengthened position for their missionary 
enterprise? I think it is important to point out that all these wars, culminating in the South 
African War, should ultimately not be evaluated in isolation, but rather interpreted within a 
rising trajectory of British imperial aggression. The Cape DRC, with their home base firmly 
ensconced in colonial territory, was over time able to reap the fruits associated with being 
loyal British subjects, while simultaneously and increasingly identifying as non-British—
especially as the 20th century developed. The DRC mission to Mashonaland was under the 
authority of the Cape DRC and their history demonstrates a bumpy colonial affiliation over 
time. 
 
Black evangelists laid the groundwork for the DRC mission to Mashonaland. However, these 
so-called evangelists should be more appropriately described as pioneer missionaries, who 
under very dangerous circumstances went into the region to establish contacts with chiefs, 
including with the Matabele king, Lobengula.3 All missionary agents understood at the time 
that nothing could be accomplished without Lobengula’s permission. His resistance to the 
idea, as conveyed to the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society’s François Coillard, of having 
his “dogs” or “slaves” come under the influence of foreign agents was the primary cause for a 
delayed start to mission work there.4 This was not only the case from the side of the DRC, but 
also for other agents, such as Coillard, who was the first to attempt acquiring such 
permission, but without success. Hence, the submission of the Matabele at the hands of the 
Chartered Company through the so-called Rudd Concession of 1888, which effectively 
contained but not eliminated the threat posed by Lobengula, was the sine qua non for the start 
of mission work in the country. In fact, the Chartered Company subsequently had the power 
to give or withhold residency to prospective emigrants, including missionaries.5  
 
Under these circumstances, it is no surprise that DRC missionary literature from this period 
generally expresses appreciation and gratitude towards Cecil John Rhodes and his Company. 
Rhodes also apparently made sure of their loyalty by donating land, and financially 
supporting their projects. Olivier, for example, writes that Rhodes had once during a time of 
                                               
3  See W. J. van der Merwe, Sendinggenade in Mashonaland (Kaapstad, N.G. Kerk uitgewers, 1952), 19ff. 
4  See François Coillard to Rev. J. Smith, as quoted in M. J. de Beer Bester, “Die Betrekking tussen die Kaapse NG 
Sendingkerk en die Suid-Rhodesiese regering (1891–1937).” MA thesis, (Pretoria: University of South Africa, 1969), 
5. 
5  See M. J. de Beer Bester, 13. 
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particular food shortages provided and transported supplies to the value of 40 pound to 
Morgenstêr, and on another instance, he gave a financial donation of 50 pound to the 
mission.6 
 
It is clear that it was not Lobengula’s intention to surrender power through the Rudd 
Concession. In fact, he still referred to himself as king and gave directives regarding which 
areas he had chosen to reserve for himself, but the Chartered Company simply ignored any of 
that and treated the whole of Mashonaland as their own. Bester writes that the ownership of 
Mashonaland changed virtually overnight and with it the prohibition on mission work was 
lifted.7 This misunderstanding, to put it mildly, of who was in charge in the land naturally 
created much tension and resentment from the side of the Matabele, and the unresolved 
situation would eventually flare up in the first Matabele War. 
 
Missionary Foundations: The Value of the Rifle and the “Godless” Company’s Actions 
against Africans 
The early years of the Mashonaland mission, which preceded the first Matabele War, was an 
insecure time for the principal of the Mashonaland mission, A. A. Louw and his colleagues. 
Active among the Banyai (Shona)8 at a time when the Ndebele (Matabele) was very much a 
force to be reckoned with, the people among whom they ministered obviously had very 
concrete objectives for welcoming the missionary presence in their midst. After all, the 
missionaries were not overtly aggressive in their acquisition of land or in subjecting their 
people, but merely in winning their souls, whatever that meant. Although it is risky to ascribe 
motives to people whose personal testimony is inaccessible, one should nevertheless ask the 
question, what were the Shona hoping for in their interactions with the missionaries? One 
clue is given in an early letter by A. A. Louw’s colleague, S. P. Helm in 1892. He relates a 
discussion between the mission’s Basotho evangelists and a Shona group whose chief had 
formerly agreed to have an evangelist placed among them, but who had subsequently died. 
Now the question was how to convince the people to continue with their deceased leader’s 
agreed course of action? In the discussion it transpired that the people wanted a token 
something that would serve as “a light” from the side of the missionaries, since it was evident 
                                               
6  S. P. Olivier, Ons Kerk in Rhodesië: ‘n Historiese oorsig van die Ned. Geref. Kerk, Sending en Onderwys. 1895–1945 
(Paarl: Fisher en Seuns, 1946), 205. 
7  S. P. Olivier, Ons Kerk in Rhodesië, 14. 
8  See A. Dreyer, Historisch Album van De Nederduitsche Gereformeerde Kerk in Zuid Afrika, No. 2 (Kaapstad: Cape 
Times Beperkt, 1910), 42–47. 
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that the “land is dark and our chief dead” [transl.]. What could serve as such a light? “Een 
achterlaaier” [a rifle] was the answer. That could not do, due to the laws of the land and the 
mission’s own policy in this regards, and although the “evangelist” Micha was able to 
convince them to rather accept some blankets as token of missionary “light,” it remains 
significant that they asked for a rifle in the first place, I believe. Might it be symbolic of what 
the mission was understood to be good for in the eyes of their prospective converts?9  
 
The matter of protection and the related issue of rifles and their hoped for acquisition by 
Shona chiefs were also emphasised by A. A. Louw in his autobiographical account. A. A. 
Louw writes that it was quite evident that these chiefs, with whom they made initial 
arrangements, primarily expected “temporal protection and benefit from us”10 [transl.]. He 
especially mentions the rifle as the most sought after item. Chief Mugabe, who was the local 
authority where the DRC headquarters, Morgenstêr was established, repeatedly assured A. A. 
Louw that he had no interest in being evangelised, but that he wanted to have a rifle very 
much: “All I want is a rifle; other than that I don’t care for anything” [transl.].11 A. A. Louw 
carried on to describe a situation in which Mugabe incessantly demands a rifle whenever 
missionaries visited his kraal. This impasse remained until A. A. Louw threatened to remove 
their mission from Mugabe’s land and move it to a less demanding chiefdom, unless Mugabe 
ceased his questing after guns, and instead would agree to send a representative to visit all of 
the kraals falling under his jurisdiction together with the missionaries. Faced with this 
ultimatum, Mugabe eventually agreed as described by A. A. Louw.12  
 
If this rendition of their interactions are assumed to be more or less truthful, and there is no 
reason to suspect A. A. Louw of being economical with the truth, one has to immediately ask, 
why? Given that Mugabe had no interest in the message of the missionaries, why would he 
want them to stay even when they refused his principal demand? The most logical conclusion 
is that he considered the presence of the missionaries a proxy armour to that of the now 
inaccessible rifle. This is extremely ironic in light of the fact that A. A. Louw was ultimately 
unable to protect Mugabe when the latter fell afoul of the colonial authority. Mugabe, from 
the point of view of the colonial rulers, was responsible for much unrest, attacking and 
                                               
9  Dutch Reformed Church Archive [PPV 149], Aug. 5, 1892, S. P. Helm to J. H. Neethling. 
10  A. A. Louw, Die Môrester in Mashonaland (Stellenbosch: Die Christen-Studenteverenigingmaatskappy van Suid-
Afrika, 1954), 28–29.  
11  A. A. Louw, Die Môrester, 40. 
12  A. A. Louw, Die Môrester, 45. 
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raiding his neighbours. This eventually led to the threat of his arrest, which A. A. Louw 
attempted to prevent, but tensions instead escalated to a point where Mugabe was killed and 
much of his kraal destroyed. A. A. Louw later recalled his own distress at the underhanded 
way in which the Company officers executed their surprise attack without informing him, the 
resident missionary, first. Apparently, A. A. Louw’s actions to first of all unsuccessfully 
prevent the attack, but then successfully securing continued right of residence for the people 
at Mugabe’s mountain, were enough to win the trust of Mugabe’s people, even though their 
chief had died.13 
 
As things developed, the mission continued to face divided loyalties, but perhaps a steady 
increase in trust, from the side of the people with whom they interacted. A. A. Louw 
mentions, for example in a 1894 letter to the sisters of the Banjai mission society, how one 
Banjai chief had inexplicably (for the better) changed his attitude to the mission after only a 
year earlier threatening to attack them. Such changed attitudes evidently had much to do with 
local power struggles. A. A. Louw mentions the influence of another chief in this regard. 
However, one great stumbling block remained; the Matabele. A. A. Louw expressed 
frustration and a wish: If only the might of the Matabele could be broken, then the entrance to 
the Banjai would be wide open.14  
 
This was written, interestingly, in the aftermath of the first Matabele War, which had already 
significantly weakened prospects for Lobengula’s people. The war and its side effects 
perhaps contributed to or even caused a situation that is next described: great famine among 
the people. “Het vooruitsicht voor de Kaffirs is donker voorwaar” [Prospects for the Kaffirs 
(sic) are certainly dark].15  
 
The first Matabele War itself took place in the year after the killing of Mugabe. Lobengula 
apparently felt the need to show who the real ruler of the land was, and so in early 1893 he 
sent his impis to punish the Shona for their disobedience after a Shona chief had refused to 
pay tribute to him. The following raids into Mashonaland and accompanied loss of life 
impelled the Chartered Company to act as the rulers that they had portrayed themselves to be. 
                                               
13  See A. A. Louw, Die Môrester, 96–105. 
14  DRC Archive [KS 849], 11.4.1894, A. A. Louw aan de susters van de bajai sending vereniging. 
15  DRC Archive [KS 849], 11.4.1894. 
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They retaliated and their superior fire-power ensured a relatively quick end to the conflict, 
with the result that the Matabele were temporarily pacified.16 
 
One result of this war, from the point of view of the DRC, was that numerous Boer families 
who had formerly settled in Mashonaland decided to reverse their trek and return to the south. 
At the time there had been a DRC minister (Paul Nel) in Bulawayo with the missive of 
ministering to the white settlers, but he temporarily left during the war.17 A. A. Louw also 
reported from Morgenstêr seeing many ox-wagons going past their station towards the 
Transvaal.18 However, this evacuation of Boers created only a temporary vacuum, which 
started to fill already in 1894 as numerous new settlers began to arrive, including many 
arrivals in the “conquered Eldorado, Bulawayo” [transl.].19 This created the situation wherein 
A. A. Louw and the Mashonaland mission would also over time become involved in “white” 
ministry, as distinct from their primary role as missionaries to “black” Africans (see below). 
 
In an 1895 letter the issue of education came to the fore, especially the fact that the mission 
was trying to start a school but that there seemed to be zero interest from the side of the 
populace who, according to A. A. Louw, was completely demoralised from the wars with the 
Matabele. He speculated whether with the help of the government some form of mandatory 
education should be introduced, as was the case in the Cape colony. Such a regulation indeed 
occurred through the intervention of the military, it seems, and A. A. Louw mentioned how 
this resulted in things going much better in the second half of the previous year regarding 
school attendance. A. A. Louw still mentioned the relatively small number of converts at 
different kraals. Work was going slowly according to his estimation.20  
 
Statistics of people baptised, attendees at church, children in school, and so forth bear out A. 
A. Louw’s pessimistic view of the progress that the mission was making during the early 
years.21 This remained the status quo until the first decade of the 20th century.  
 
                                               
16  See P. E. N. Tindall, A History of Central Africa, (London: Longmans, 1968), 160–161. 
17  S. P. Olivier, Ons Kerk in Rhodesië, 23. 
18  De Kerkbode, 24 November, 1893. 
19  Olivier, Ons Kerk in Rhodesië, 24. 
20  DRC Archive [KS 849], Feb 13, 1895, A. A. Louw to J. H. Neethling. 
21  Mashonaland Statistiek, 1911-1916, Dutch Reformed Church Archive [KS933], n.d. 
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The Mashonaland uprisings (First Chimurenga)  
Given what I described above regarding a demoralised population and small amounts of 
converts, it might already seem that my thesis is contradicted. British war with Africans did 
not have obviously good results for the mission. However, if we take a longer view, things 
may seem somewhat different. Consider the relatively straightforward imposition of 
European-style religion and education on an indifferent, weakened, and rudderless 
population. Of course, results were not immediately forthcoming, but it is well-known that 
mission schools everywhere were among the most effective tools in converting and 
Christianising a population. Is there any reason to think it would be different for the DRC 
mission in Mashonaland?  
 
The Mashonaland uprising, also known as the First Chimurenga, created tensions all around. 
In 1896 Matabele chiefs followed by Shona chiefs went into rebellion against the colonial 
authority.22 White settlers in the country were also targeted in certain cases. The colonial 
authority attempted—seemingly at the first hint of danger—to persuade the missionaries to 
vacate their posts and move themselves into a laager together with other expats at Fort 
Victoria. The DRC mission resisted this for as long as possible. They had a virtual tightrope 
of relationships to negotiate. They did not want to be seen kowtowing to the colonial 
government. The closer their colonial identification became, the less trustworthy they might 
seem from the side of the African population. Therefore, A. A. Louw and colleagues 
attempted to remain at Morgenstêr. They even planned to flee to nearby caves or hide away at 
a small granite hillock in the event of real trouble rather than to decamp to Fort Victoria.23 A. 
A. Louw’s personal letters tell the story of mounting pressure. In May 1896, A. A. Louw 
wrote for example that their mission station was strong and virtually impenetrable from 
outside attack. He also claimed that the situation in their area was less threatening than in 
other parts. A greater threat, it seemed, was that posed by rinderpest to cattle.24 
 
A month and a half later there was a letter from the native commissioner at Fort Victoria 
warning A. A. Louw that his persistence to stay at Morgenstêr was entirely at his own risk. 
Natives in several places had suddenly risen and numerous murders had been reported. 
                                               
22  Olivier, Ons Kerk in Rhodesië, 35–36. 
23  See Van der Merwe, Sendinggenade in Mashonaland, 30, 45. 
24  DRC Archive [KS 849], May 3, 1896, A. A. Louw to “Geliefde Oom.”  
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Should further danger arise, a message would be sent …25 A. A. Louw, in his reply to the 
above, thanked the official and apologised if his decision to remain might seem like 
foolhardiness, but the natives in his area were quite calm, he stated. In the event of danger, he 
undertook to have his wife sent to Victoria via hammock (machila).26 
 
A. A. Louw’s apparent unwillingness to give in to the demands of the colonial authority 
becomes better explained, when only a few days later he writes a letter to the mission 
secretary complaining about the actions of the “Goddelooze Companjie” [Godless Company] 
as a cause of strife in the land. The question of whether or not to leave the station and go to 
Fort Victoria recurs. A. A. Louw described his pondering on these pages regarding what 
would be best for the mission. For the sake of his wife and children, he would be willing to 
go, but in the meantime he was content to stay. There was no danger in his immediate area 
and he trusted the judgment of his evangelists regarding the mood of the Africans.27 
 
A few days after the last one, another letter surfaced in which A. A. Louw still contended that 
no danger was apparent. He reckoned that “onze kaffirs ons te lief hebben om tegen ons op te 
staan” [our kaffirs (sic) love us too much to rise against us]. He also believed that the Lord 
would protect them in the event of real danger. On the other hand, he would not want to be 
stubborn, and so he mentioned almost as an anti-climax that an ox wagon was in fact on its 
way and that the missionaries would be returning to Fort Victoria with it.28 In the same letter, 
he mentioned a report regarding 47 people who had been murdered near Salisbury, including 
someone he had known quite well. As he sat there writing he described hearing the war siren, 
which meant that the company was calling up “onze kaffirs for their war tegen vihandige 
Vakaranga” [our kaffirs (sic) for their war against adversarial Vakaranga].29 This is, 
therefore, an example of direct impact on the mission as a result of British war. Surely this 
whole saga would have illustrated to the Vakaranga that the mission was powerless to protect 
them, or did it do the converse, i.e. convince them that the mission and the powerful company 
was one and the same, with the former perhaps acting as the somewhat kinder, yet 
ineffectual, face of that very same colonial entity?  
 
                                               
25  DRC Archive [KS 849], June 29, 1896, Native Commissioner to A. A. Louw. 
26  DRC Archive [KS 849], July 1, 1896, A. A. Louw to Native Commissioner. 
27  DRC Archive [KS 849], July 6, 1896, A. A. Louw to J. H. Neethling. 
28  DRC Archive [KS 849], July 14, 1896, A. A. Louw to J. H. Neethling.  
29  DRC Archive [KS 849], July 14, 1896, A. A. Louw to J. H. Neethling. 
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In the aftermath of this war, it seems that one effect it had on the mission was an extended 
leave of absence for A. A. Louw. He wrote a letter in late June 1897, which explained this 
situation. There were different reasons for his absence, but one of those was that “de onlusten 
met de Kaffirs, onbestendig bleef” [the kaffir (sic) unrests remain unpredictable]. Therefore, 
he asked for an extension of leave until March 1898.30 
 
Whilst on leave in South Africa it seems the Louws kept in close contact with matters in 
Mashonaland. For example, Andrew’s wife, Cinie Louw, wrote a letter on behalf of her 
husband in September 1897 in which she bemoaned the fact that there still seemed to be no 
hunger or thirst for the gospel, which had to be carried to the people, rather than that they 
would come to it of their own free will. When they did come to church or school, they 
apparently expected to be paid for the effort.31  
 
Although, this disinterest in the missionary discourse seemed to have continued for some 
time, a different note creeps into at least some of the reports of the mission station master 
during the following period. In November of 1897, A. A. Louw, writing from “Vische-hoek,” 
asked the mission commission for a third missionary, as well as for a teacher to work 
especially with women. An expansion of the work was thus envisioned.32 Were there 
justifiable grounds for expansion at this stage? Or was it the sea breeze at Fishhoek, or 
something else that planted the seed of optimism in the missionary heart in spite of the rather 
static number of converts?  
 
Whatever the case, just over a year later A. A. Louw could write from Morgenstêr: “Met ons 
werk gaat het beter dan ooit te voren; onze school bloeit ...”33 Whether this was as a result of 
a strengthening in the teaching staff or a change of direction in the spiritual winds blowing 
over Mashonaland, or some other reason, is unclear. A. A. Louw did not elaborate. However, 
the theme of expansion remained present, particularly because of the unexpected growth in 
population by newly arrived migrants form elsewhere, around 10 000 people under a leader 
who had been granted permission to settle in Rhodesia by the Chartered Company.34 A. A. 
Louw did not specify from where these new arrivals had come. Had they perhaps been 
                                               
30  DRC Archive [KS 849], June 29, 1897, A. A. Louw to J. H. Neethling. 
31  DRC Archive [KS 849], Sept. 21, 1897, Mev. Louw to “Liewe Oom Jan.” 
32  DRC Archive [KS 849], Nov. 27, 1897, A. A. Louw to “De Lede van de ... Zending Commissie Stellenbosch.” 
33  DRC Archive [KS 849], Feb. 2, 1899, A. A. Louw to J. H. Neethling. 
34  DRC Archive [KS 849], May 4, 1899 , A. A. Louw to J. H. Neethling. 
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uprooted from the Transvaal under the threatening clouds of yet another, even more 
devastating war in the region? Whatever the case, these arrivals created a windfall harvest of 
potential converts to the mission. 
 
The South African (Anglo-Boer) War 
When the Anglo-Boer War did erupt it brought with it a host of complicating factors, but also 
opportunities for the Mashonaland mission. Initially, in his first mention of it, as far as I 
could ascertain, A. A. Louw described it as something terrible, but also mentioned that they 
remained unaffected by it, continuing calmly with their work, apparently.35  
 
It scarcely has to be emphasised that the South African War affected the mission differently 
than the conflicts discussed above. The Matabele and Mashonaland Wars pitted the Chartered 
Company against black Africans with Afrikaner missionaries in the cross-fire, but still in a 
quasi-neutral position. A limited role of mediation was possible for them under the 
circumstances. A. A. Louw and his mission could imagine themselves occasionally in the role 
of protectors of the Africans, even though the missionaries themselves eventually had to 
accept refuge and hence protection from the colonial authority. During the South African 
War, officially between Boer and Brit, the missionaries retained an official, if superficial, 
neutrality due to the fact that they were British subjects. However, there could be no doubt 
that their sympathies lay with their fellow Afrikaners. This was possibly exasperated by the 
close involvement of A. A. Louw’s brothers in this conflict. A. F. Louw became a well-
known chaplain to Boer POWs on St. Helena, which had direct implications for the DRC 
mission enterprise, as I shall discuss below. However, more directly, and tragically, the Louw 
family lost their younger brother Willie, who was executed by a British firing squad after 
being convicted of treason due to his status as a Cape Rebel fighting on the side of the 
Boers.36 
 
It would be hard to imagine that this war and the personal cost involved for A. A. Louw—and 
possibly also other missionaries—would not have strained relationships with the colonial 
power in what became Rhodesia. And conversely, if this was the case, would the situation 
have engendered a more sympathetic relationship between Afrikaner missionaries and their 
                                               
35  DRC Archive [KS 849], Feb. 22, 1900, A. A. Louw to J. H. Neethling. 
36  See Johan Louw, Ds. A. F. Louw op St. Helena. Briewe en belewenisse (Kaapstad: N G Kerk, 1963), 15, 30. 
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prospective African converts, with both groups now having experienced suffering at the 
hands of the Empire? Although there is more evidence in support of the former 
presupposition than the latter, questions regarding such subtleties are not really unequivocally 
answerable on the basis of the historical documents available. However, what we do have is 
an indication of a strengthened mission due to reinforcements among the staff. Already in 
1901 A. A. Louw wrote expressing his joy regarding the fact that the mission commission 
had strengthened their hand with the addition of three additional non-ordained missionaries.37 
He furthermore pleaded for at least one more ordained missionary, a request necessitated by 
the expansion of their work, including among the white population in the area of Victoria.38  
 
This was an interesting development, because just as another mission enthusiast, A. A. 
Louw’s brother in law D. F. Malan, would later adopt a missionary attitude39 towards the 
upliftment of his so-called “own people,” i.e. poor white Afrikaners, so A. A. Louw and the 
Mashonaland mission here set down something of a precedent by also providing not only 
evangelistic ministry but also education to the white Afrikaans-speaking settlers in that 
vicinity, many of whom could also have been classified in the category of poor whites, or so 
it would seem. 
 
Such diverse ministries could now be undertaken because A. F. Louw’s chaplaincy in St 
Helena, along with that of another relative George Murray in Ceylon, enabled a revival 
among Boer prisoners on these islands, which resulted in a substantial number of new recruits 
for the DRC missionary enterprise. All of the mission fields would benefit from a 
strengthening of their staff over the next decade, including Mashonaland.40 In early 1902, A. 
A. Louw’s letters made mention of new missionaries in their midst, already before the end of 
the war, who must have come from a different source than the POW camps, of course.41 This 
letter, as well as following ones in 1902 and beyond, speaks of conversions, growth and 
expansion.42 
 
                                               
37  DRC Archive [KS 849], March 12, 1901, A. A. Louw to J. H. Neethling. 
38  DRC Archive [KS 849], March 15, 1901. A. A. Louw to J. H. Neethling. 
39  See Richard Elphick, The Equality of Believers: Protestant Missionaries and the Racial Politics of South Africa 
(Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2012), 135–138. 
40  See J. W. Kok, Sonderlinge Vrug: Die Invloed van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog op die Sendingaksie van die N.G. Kerk 
in S.A. (Pretoria: N.G. Kerkboekhandel, 1971). 
41  DRC Archive [KS 849], Jan. 22, 1902, A. A. Louw to J. H Neethling. 
42  DRC Archive [KS 849], See April 18, 1902, April 25, 1903, A. A. Louw to J. H. Neethling. 
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It is notable that even with an expanded missionary force and additional stations, many of the 
same challenges of a decade earlier seemed to persist, i.e. low levels of interest in the gospel, 
and a problematic interrelationship between the mission and colonialism. Regarding the 
missionary perceptions of colonial influence—as distinct from the mission—there is an 
interesting quote from an early 20th century report, which was in all likelihood drawn up by 
A. A. Louw in his capacity as head of the mission: “a civilised heathen is a double heathen” 
[transl.].43 This refers to the situation experienced at Victoria mission station, where colonial 
mores and practices had a stronger impact than elsewhere, none of it good from the point of 
view of the DRC mission. Presumably, the theory was that it would be preferable for 
Africans to experience their first “European” contact via missionaries. Not that that 
necessarily made a noticeable difference in terms of results. This report tells a story of 
relatively small interest in conversion by Shona people from various mission stations. From 
Chibi, for example, a line that seems familiar from other A. A. Louw correspondence I have 
seen elsewhere, crops up: “De heidenen begeeren’t Evangelie niet … Op de kralen komen zij 
meestal langzaam en lusteloos bijeen. Zij luisteren ook maar lusteloos, en na’t Amen is’t òf 
‘n gelach omdat zij de oogen moesten dicht houden, òf dadelijk een praatje over tabak of iets 
dergelijks.” [The heathens do not desire the gospel … At the kraals they mostly arrive slowly 
and without enthusiasm. They also listen rather unenthusiastically, and after Amen it is either 
laughter because they had to keep their eyes shut, or immediately small talk about tobacco or 
something similar.]44  
 
Still, the question arises, why would they be there and expose themselves to the absurdities of 
the missionaries if they did not feel themselves in some ways pressured to participate in the 
mission’s activities? Or were they perhaps attracted to the novelty of the mission station with 
its strange new ways and ideas, even if the people were not in any way convinced by what 
they were hearing? Although it is unclear when this report was written exactly, the number of 
stations mentioned suggests a much later date than then late 19th century correspondence of 
A. A. Louw to the mission secretary, J. H. Neethling, and in fact, the latest document cited by 
it is from 1912. That gives us a clue, which makes the similarity in tone to A. A. Louw’s 
letters of nearly two decades earlier quite interesting. The more things changed, the more they 
stayed the same in Mashonaland, apparently. 
 
                                               
43  DRC Archive [B130], Verslag van Zendingwerk (ca. 1912), 29. 
44  DRC Archive [B130], p. 30. 
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Conclusion 
The interwoven history of colonialism and the 19th century missionary movement is a well-
known theme in historiography, including church history. However, in our current context 
where decolonisation is such a buzzword it makes sense to revisit this theme to ascertain 
exactly how these powers of a former era related to one another. The reasons for this should 
be obvious for historians, because it concerns the simple fact that our contemporary political 
and religious contexts were formed within the mixing bowl of those initial contacts and 
conflicts involving Africans, colonials, and of course, Christian missionaries. What I 
presented here is a narrative of mission and colonialism on the micro level. It is apparent that 
the different actors in the drama had different, even contradictory expectations of one 
another. As such, tensions were created on different levels. The BSAC clearly assumed that 
the presence of DRC missionaries in Mashonaland was to the company’s benefit. Probably 
conservative missionaries, such as the ones at Morgenstêr, were regarded as helpful in 
strengthening the bulwark of colonial control in the area. Missionaries helped to pacify the 
population and aided in the people’s assimilation to colonial norms and standards, especially 
through their educational activities. 
 
The Shona people were according to the missionaries’ own reports and statistics rather 
unenthusiastic about the spiritual message the latter attempted to convey. However, some of 
their chiefs, especially in the early years, were happy enough to have missionaries in their 
midst. The mission was likely understood as both a form of protection against the attacks of 
groups such as the Matabele, but also as an important buffer against the might and draconian 
measures of the colonial authority. This view apparently held true, even when the mission 
proved to be not very successful in preventing calamitous impositions such as the actions that 
led to the demise of Chief Mugabe. 
 
As such, the mission really found itself in a classic win-win situation. The fact that their 
converts grew so slowly was a thorn in the flesh of an otherwise healthy and prosperous 
body; a body that only grew in relative strength with every war involving the colonial rulers. 
In each case, they could differentiate themselves further from the increasingly unpopular 
rulers, but without needing to outright side with a rebellious population. The one instance 
where such a position possibly became most difficult to maintain was during the Anglo-Boer 
War and its aftermath. And even though their sympathies during this conflict would have 
been obvious to the British rulers, the fact is that they were not repatriated. Instead, they 
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quietly continued with their work, only to gain considerably with a substantial strengthening 
of missionary personnel through the recruitment of Boer POWs by A. A. Louw’s brother, A. 
F. Louw, among others. Therefore, we may conclude with a degree of confidence, that the 
assumption that the DRC mission in Mashonaland benefited from the various British imperial 
wars in the area, is not such a far-fetched notion after all. 
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